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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ELMA ARLENE RAMMELL,

:

Petitioner-Appellant,

:

-vs-

:

SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
14618

:

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted following a plea of guilty to
the crime of obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud and deception.

She did not take an

appeal but later filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus
was denied by the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.,
after a hearing on April 29, 1976.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON Ail?EAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the decision
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 9, 1973, appellant plead guilty to the
charge of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud or misrepresentation.

This is a violation of Title 58, Chapter 37,

Section 8(4)(ii) of the Utah Code Annotated (1971, as amended).
Appellant was sentenced to prison for a term not to exceed
five years.

She filed a motion for a change of sentence in

September of 1973 (Case No. 25116) . No disposition appears
to have been made of this motion.

After approximately two

years appellant was released on parole.

Not four months

later, she again committed the same crime, plead guilty, and
was again sentenced to prison.

She did not appeal.

On the 8th day of March, 1976, appellant again filed
a motion for vacation of sentence, Case No. 28575.

That

motion was denied by the Honorable Gordon R. Hall on March
18, 1976.

Later, on May 27, 1976, the appellant filed the

present petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which petition
was also dismissed by the lower court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM A FELONY CONVICTION.
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Appellant plead guilty to uttering a forged
prescription to obtain the drugs Dalmone and Phenaphen.
This conduct is proscribed by two sections of the
Utah Code Annotated.

The Pharmacy Act prohibits using

forged prescriptions to obtain drugs and medicines
generally.

It was passed in 1953 as Chapter 17 of Title

58 of the Utah Code.

The Controlled Substances Act, on

the other hand, is a more limited act aimed at preventing
possession of certain specifically named drugs of which
the above are derivatives.

This later act was passed

in 1971 as Chapter 37 of Title 58. A violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-14.13 of the Pharmacy Act is
classified as a Class A Misdemeanor, while a violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (4) (iii) of the Controlled
Substances Act is a third degree felony (see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-17-26 and 58-37-8 (4) (b)).

Appellant was

sentenced under the later law and now pursues this
petition alleging that she should be sentenced under
the lesser penalty.
Appellant claims that (1) she should receive
the lighter sentence since the two acts were passed
contemporaneously and (2) that since the Pharmacy Act
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was not cross-indexed to the Controlled Substances Act
she, as a "citizen concerned with an understanding of
the law" was not "provided [with] reasonably clear notice
of the sanctions annexed to the commission of a given
act." (Appellantfs briefr vPP-6--7^) Respondent submits
that appellant was correctly sentenced for any one of
the following four reasons:
contemporaneously passed.

(1) The two acts were not

The later act which partially

overlaps an early act thus prevails.

(2)

The Utah

Legislature very clearly pronounced that the Controlled
Substances Act is to be given priority over any other
overlapping provisions.

(3)

This Court has said that

the more specific provision (the Controlled Substances
Act) should prevail over a more general law.

(4) Appel-

lant is precluded from claiming (in good faith) ignorance
of the instant statutes since previous convictions and
motions made by her were identical to those now in
issue.

For these reasons, respondent submits that

the decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
Appellant's only authority for her position is
a misplaced reliance upon the case of State v. Shondel,
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22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), which was followed
in

State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969).
Like the present case, Shondel involved an

overlap of two Utah drug acts with different penalties
attached.

Shondel had been sentenced under the greater

penalty, but for two reasons, the Utah Supreme Court, in
a three to two decision, held that he was entitled to
the lesser penalty*

In the first place, both acts had

been passed by the same session of the legislature.
Secondly, one of the statutes under which Shondel was
convicted included the language:
" . . . whenever the possession
. . . of any drug or substance would
constitute an offense under this
act and also constitute an offense
under [other] laws of this state . . .
such offense shall not be punishable
under this act, but shall be punishable under such other provisions of
law." Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6(g)
(1953).
The Court felt that "one concerned with compliance with
the law" was forced by the last phrase of the above
quoted statute, to go searching to find the "other
i

provisions."

•

•

The Court held that because of this

language, and because the two acts were passed at the
same time, the defendant Shondel was therefore entitled
to the lesser sentence.
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Respondent submits that the Shondel case is
entirely distinguishable from the present case and
offers no-authority for appellant's position.
(1)
the earlier.

A later statute takes precedence over
The present case does not involve two

contemporaneously enacted laws as did Shondel.

The

Pharmacy Act was passed in 1953 and the Controlled
Substances Act was passed eighteen years later in 1971.
As the Court in Shondel noted:
"[There is a] generally
recognized rule that where there
is conflict between two legislative
acts the latest will ordinarily
prevail." 453 P.2d at 147.
Thus, if the facts in Shondel had been as they are in
the instant case, Shondel would have gone the other way.
Appellant, however, would argue that since the
penalty involved in the Pharmacy Act was increased in
1971, the entire act is renovated and thus retroactively
made contemporaneous with the Controlled Substances Act.
Respondent, finding no pertinent authority, and noting
that appellant has also failed in such an offer, expresses
doubt that an increment in penalty weight can have such
an effect.

In any case, the issue is of mere academic

interest since other facts sufficiently resolve the
primary question.
~6-

(2)

The legislature clearly designated the

statute that is to take precedence*

In Shondel, the

Utah Supreme Court said:
" [If] both statutes were
passed at the same session of
the legislature . . . t h e rule
that the later act takes precedence
over the former has no application
unless there is a clearly-expressed
intention to that effect." 453
P.2d at 147. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Controlled Substances' Act takes
precedence over the Pharmacy Act by reason of its
later date of enactment,. and^it also .jmanifests
a

"clearly-expressed intention to that effect," by

the Utah Legislature.

This legislative intent was

specifically set out and made crystal clear by Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-19, the closing paragraph of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act:
"It is the purpose of this act
to regulate and control the substances
designated within section 58-37-4, and
whenever the . . . penalties imposed,
relating to substances controlled by
this act shall be or appear to be in
conflict with . . . any other laws of
this state, the provisions of this
act shall be controlling."
(Emphasis
added.)
(3)

The more specific act should prevail over

the more general.

There is an additional rule of statutory

-7-

interpretation which precludes appellant's interpretation of the law.

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently

upheld the rule that when two statutes conflict or
overlap, the more specific statute takes precedence
over that which is more general.

See Bateman v. Board

of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1957), and
Pacific Intermountain Express v. State Tax Commission,
7 Utah 2d

15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957).

This position is

widely if not universally followed in both criminal
and civil cases.

See State v. Rice, 516 P.2d 1222

(Ariz. 1973); People v. Gilbert, 462 P.2d 580 (Cal.
1969); State v. Beckman, 368 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1962);
In re Smart, 505 P.2d 1179 (Hawaii 1973); and State v.
Roderick, 375 P.2d 1005 (Idaho 1962).
Applying this rule to the two statutes here
involved, it is obvious that the Controlled Substances
Act is more specific and thus the controlling law in
this case.

The Pharmacy Act deals broadly with the

procedures for operating a pharmaceutical enterprise
in the State of Utah.

The section in question, Utah

Code Ann. § 58-17-14.13 merely provides, in general
terms, that it is illegal to use fraud or deception
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to obtain any drugs or medicines from a pharmacy.

The

Controlled Substances Act, on the other hand, is aimed
at controlling the acquisition, possession and use of
a specifically designated group of compounds.

In other

words, whereas the Pharmacy Act is directed to all drugs
and medicines, the Controlled Substances Act carves out
selected drugs or substances that are more dangerous and
which are more subject to abuse.

The differing penalties

reflect the purposes of the acts.

For example, a forgery

of a prescription for birth control pills or penicillin
would violate the Pharmacy Act, but not the more narrow
scope of the Controlled Substances Act.

Therefore, the

law provides that appellant should be sentenced under the
felony provision in the instant case, because of the
controlled substances obtained.
(4) Appellant is precluded from claiming
ignorance since she previously filed motions which contradict
such an allegation.

In Shoridel, one of the overlapping

provisions said:
" . . . whenever the possession
. . . of any drug or substance would
constitute an offense under this
act and also constitute an offense
under [other] laws of this state
. . . such offense shall not be
punishable under this act, but shall
be punishable under such other provision
of law." Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (g).
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The Utah Supreme Court held that "one concerned with
compliance with the law" was forced, by the last
phrase of the above statute, to search elsewhere to
find some "other provision of law."

The Court held

that a statute should be sufficiently clear so that a
person who desired to obey the law would know how to
conform to the law and what punishment might be imposed
for nonconformance.

22 Utah 2d at 346. Appellant argues

that she was ignorant of the supposed conflicting provisions
of the law and thus should receive her punishment under
the lesser provision.
position.

The 1973 motion precludes this

Obviously at the time of the arraignment for

the second offense, she was fully aware of the claims she
now makes.

In the present case, the statute is very dif-

ferent from that in Shondel, for it says:
". . . whenever the . . .
penalties imposed. . . shall be
or appear to be in conflict with
. . . any other laws of this state,
the provisions of this act shall be
controlling." Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-19. (Emphasis added.)
Obviously, nobody is sent searching for the proper penalty.
Appellant was first convicted in 1973 of
obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation.
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She thereafter filed a motion for change of that
sentence in 1973, a copy of which is hereto appended.
That motion shows thai- she was aware of the Pharmacy
Act as well as the Controlled Substances Act as
early as 1973, since that motion raised the same
points as are argued here.

Thereafter, knowing

full well the possible penalties, and only four
months after being placed on parole for her
earlier crime, appellant again, in 1975, committed
the same crime of obtaining a controlled substance
by misrepresenation.
POINT II
HABEAS CORPUS IS IMPROPER IN THIS CASE.
This Court has repeatedly expressed its
concern over the increased use of habeas corpus writs
as substitutes for timely appeal proceedings.

See

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968);
and Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34
(1972).

A substantial line of cases state quite
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clearly that matters which were known or should have
been known by counsel and defendant at the time of
trial should have been disposed of by the regular
appellate procedure.

Brown, supra, and Johnson v.

Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970).

This

Court has universally held that appeal is the regular
procedure for review of injustices and irregularities
in lower court proceedings*
This Court has recognized that there is a
limited exception to the above rules. As the Court
said in Johnson v. Turner, supra at page 904:
"Where it appears that
there has been such a miscarriage
of justice that it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine
a conviction, and that for some
justifiable reason an appeal was
not taken thereon, we do not regard
rules of procedure as being so
absolute as to prevent us from
correcting any such obvious
injustice."
Thus, the Court has laid out a two-pronged test for
determining the justifiability of a habeas corpus
petition.

First, there must be an "unconscionable

miscarriage of justice," and second, there must be
some "justifiable reason" for not taking an appeal
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Appellant strenuously urges that a miscarriage
of justice has taken place in that she received an improper
sentence.

Respondent has shown, however, that the sentence

was proper.
of the test.

Therefore, appellant fails in the first part
As for the second prong, appellant not only

fails to meet that requirement, she does not even try.
There is not one word in appellant's brief to justify the
fact that she did not file a timely appeal in this matter,
nor did she interpose an objection to the charge or penalty
for her second offense, notwithstanding her 1973 motion.
Therefore, since there is no showing of a "justifiable
reason" for not taking an appeal, and since appellant's
attempt at proving an "unconscionable miscarriage" has
failed, the decisions line up against her and require that
the present petition be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests that the judgment

of the lower court be

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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STATK Ot UTAH
Plaintiff
MQTIQf FOt CHASGB Cy SEMRSSEB_
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Defendant
-ooooooOeeoooooTh# &efendattt above nsaedj AHI£HS BAMHSLL, respectfully isoYes The Honorable
Brnest F # Baldwin, Jr # # «Jtuig# of the Captioned Court for §fao hit* Crdar granting
her a change of &*nt«a«a *p«a t h e ground© hereinafter r«ap#ctfally preaented*
STATMS3T Cfr THS CASS
t h e Defendant was charged with, and cornrictsd of, the alleged off eoae of
» CBTADSI2JG A CCmZCUm SUBSTAUCS Bt FRAUD » i n TLolaticn of 5S~37-*3 (L\ UCA^
The Defendant waa comdcted upon her Flea of * GUIIJX " and waa sentenced and
coaadtted t o the Utah State Prison on April 6, 1973 - ( b / the Honorable
Srneet F # Baldwin, Jr** <fcidg# )«> # .to a texia of » 0-5 YEAR3 * «
STATSMEBr (F JURI3DICTIQI
Th* Captioned Conrt i e enpowered with Jurisdieiica t o change an ILISGAI*
SENTENCE, where , as i n the instant case, » EX5CUTIC3 CF IT HAS COiMS<eED*
«*V STJffS T . LSS IIM^ 7 P«2d 325, 827, 79 ^AH 6*
FRAKKSTT* PATTED 284 P*318, 75 WTAH 231
» AN HJ-HSAL. SESTE33CS HAT B3 CCHHECTSD AT AHX TIM3 e
HEFUM y» UMirED STATS3 ^ 353 U* 3 . U 5 (1959)

STATE v- PAMMSq - Crta, No,2$Il6 _

- 2. -

Kotion .

Sept. 1 3 . 1973

GF.QUHD3 FCH RELIST .,

The Defendant r e l i e s upon the following grounde for the r e l i e f that she
reapeetfuHy eeekei

•„ * «

,

TfiS LSHSLATUH& CF Vtm IH 1971

P

DUPLICATED ITS BOLS G* 3,963 _

# # # Bf

PHOyiDIH; PUNISHXH2IT FGR TH3 SAMS COCUCf ,. # AS BOTH . • • A KISD5MEAKCE
jtfD.A.FELQir FCE c m

FOTT-HIMS (S9)

TSABS » THS UTAH SUPHHMS CCUST HAS HSPSATEDLr

H£ID THAT CCKDUCT WHICH IS MAIS RJXCSHABXS AS BCTH yiiaSMSASfQI ASP Au
FELCWf.n MUST BK KBSQIff2P A3 TO A KTSDSMgAHCa »
In 1914,.«•• t h e " SALS 0? LIQUCE TO BJDIAKS CE KALF-BJSED3 * was made punishable
a» both a HTSDT5MBAMCR and X FBLQir, t h e majority of the Court i n STATS y. CABME?IP
44 UTAH 353, 140 ?• 6?0 (1914 )ruled that the MlSDEMStfCR PUNISHMENT wae ccntrollin|
and pursuant thereto, CARHS2I was released frca t h e Utah State Prtseiw ( SES ALSOi
STATS r^ JUSTICK . 44 UTAH 484, 141 PJL09 A 9 U / )
In 1969 —

» OTTERING A FCRG2P PHBSCRTFTICS FCH A NABS OTIC t?H!G » * a d j ^ ^
punishable a s A FBLOIY . . # P e r - 53-Ha~39 U» C. A, And 53-13a-44 r
The same conduct wa» made punishable aa A, MISPg-SAHCB^ at 5.&-X7-2**
U» C« A. - anforciag t h e proviaione of 53-*l?-a4^13 U» C, A«
Pursuant t h e r e t o , TCHHT 0» FAIH was released from service of a
" 0 - 5 Yre » PMALTT for uttering a forged prescription
narcotic dnxg (in favor of t h e MISCEEMSAMCR penalty )
1969

for a
on JUIX I,T

- per STATS r» FAIR . 23 UTAH 2d 3 4 , 456 P.2d 16* (1969)

fii 3»9o9 ..M Herbert Lee Shondel

serving * 0-5 Tears * i n the Utah State Pri*

f o r P0SSESSIC2I CF LSD in. v i o l a t i o n of 5S-13a-2 U» C, A. (punishabl
• t 5fe»13a"«44 U* C, A J wate relieved of each State F^g<a,_conjfinejje
\ipe» the.rt*lin&~rf t h * Utah Stpremm Court that the 24ISBEMEAHOa
PENALTY prescribed at 53-17-26 U . C . A > ( enforcing 58~17-li^i? t
i**ia controlling ) ( Aceerd*

STATg v. 3HQ3D5L

P

22 UTAH 2d 343, 45

P*2d 146 (1969)0
Jfa j.969^*

Also released under the principle announced i n

STATS T> SHC&CSL,

STAHI v, RAKMdlL. -Crlsu ?To, 2511& _

###

- 3 . - Motion -

J g L , . U i , 1373.,

and PTATtt v~ FAIHf Supra. r were x Eddie Nercne, Thomas Eugene
Sanches and Jamas Wilson*

In 1971

...The Statute voider which the Defendant ( ARLCTS RAMHSIL } w a
c a r p e t e d , ( J U e » , 53-37-3 (4) P* C» A. ) was enacted by THE
LAH3 CF UTAH, 1971 - CHAPTER 145 SHrriQ* 8 * . , . in which the
©ffena* of » C8rAJQ0a» A CCBTBOLLB) SUBSTANCE BT FRAU& * ^aa
Bade punishable as A FKLCSiT, ( w Not aore than fi^a year* or by
a fine of not xaore than $5,000, or both » - Per

In 1971

58-37-8 (4)(yKb)UC/

• . • By the UW5 CF UTAH, 1971 - CHAPTER 142, SECTIOJ 11 • .* The
Legislature * AME2S>3> * 53-17-26 P« C. A. t o punish the
» €gtAI»I» C? >HT D3US (E MSDICIIB * i n v i o l a t i o n of 53~17~L4J.3
U. C, A» •••.AS

A . MISDQgANGa ( ••• » A f i n e not acre than

fljOOO* or i^rieonaent i n the CCUNTX JAIL for not xaor* than one
year * )
fo 1971

A3TE51 THB I3GI3LATURB HA& EMPBD 2t3 1971 SBSSICU HSFSRSS) TO ABCSTB,
The Utah Soprenae Court reaffirmed i t s position (forestalled) i n
STATB T» CAB3%3S , Sapra*, (1914 )by uttering the following words i n
STATS *. YAPP » 26 UTAH 2d 392 (Norsaber 2. 1971):
• ••*• that i n case of doubt or uncertainty
as t o the dagree of criia*, he i s
e n t i t l e d t o the LI&S2R; and correlated
thereto? MAT (THAT) A3 TO AM ALT2RHATIVB
BKTWSSK A SEVEaB CE A LE2ESST FUNISHMEOT,
HB IS EOTUIfi) TO THS UITSR "
( cf.. STATS v . TAPPr Supra., )

SEPTEMBER 14» 1973 **.

The Honorable Brnest F* Baldwin, Jr.,

Judge

-

re-sentenced HCBEST HXER2., Utah State Prison inmate # 133,14 £wsa
X£rmL.*the " 0-5 ream •» iiapoaed for » GBTAIHLNO A CCNTBOLLSD
SUBSTASCS BT FRAUD » . . .

JO: . . . » CI® YEARS IN THS SALT LA£3

COJSTT JAIL » ( with credit for time eerred ) •
The Horant (Defendant BAKMSLL ) respectfuUy 3ubalta that her case l a
indistinguishable

from the aaid case of STATB y> ROBERT HISR; and i t would *ee»

t o follow that a "UNIFORM OPERATION* of the general Lax under which RCBSST HTERZ,
wae accorded a reduced sentence would b* appfied t o effect the aaae result in her

STATS v . BAMy&UL - Crta. No, ?.?13JS

~ /•• -

Motion -

_^

• . . c&sa { con«dst«nt with AKT. I . SSC» &» CCNfST. CF UT/H. - r ^ u i r i n s that » Al
LAWS CF A GESEKU- «AffUBS SHAIX HAVB U&IFO&i OPERATION «

cc&cixisxc^

WHSRiyCBS, thai &*f twuJant-Hwuafc praya that t h i a Honorable Court w i l l grant
her a hearing at which her Stat^ Priam confinement w i l l be vacated and set aaid**
and ah# w i l l b* g£ve& a l e s s a r
f i v * (5) months and
Bated t h i s 15th.

(B&sdea#anor ) penalty

- with credit for th»

.. days already having bsan amrrtd*
d*? <* S^prtaaber, 1973*

R&apaatfttlly Subs&ttsd*
ARLE2TS BAKHELL, Defendant

A copy of t h * fbragoing MCTIOI waa trailed to*
Mr» Carl Kwwdka, County Attorney
Attention* Mr. Do» Sawaya, Aaet,,County, At
Offle* of Th* County Attcratsy
Mfctropolitan Hall of <£i3tic#
Salt L&k* City, Utah &011
THI3

DAI CF SSFTS5CBKR, I973

h A-* r

^

ABIfcEE BAiWiL, Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND POR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT

and

COMMITMENT
*& /SJ}0

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

t
\
s

-vs-

t
t
I

ARLENE RAMMELL
Defendant

2^.

CASE NO. 25116
OBTAINING A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE BY FRAUD

The above case comes on regularly before the Honorable Ernest F# Baldwin, Jr.,
Judge, this 9th March, 1973 for the passing of sentence upon the within named
defendant.

The defendant appearing in person and being represented by SEan

Sntedley, as counsel,

Assistant County Attorney, Don Sawaya, Appearing in behalf

of the State, a3 counsel*

Whereupon, the defendant Is asked is she has any legal can

to why sentence should not be passed upon her, the defendant answering that
she has none, the Judgment and sentence of this Court is pronounced as follows, towitt
"It is the judgment and sentence of this
Court that you Arlene Rammell be confined
and iirprisoned in the Utah State Prison for
the Indeterminate terra (0 to 5 years) as
provided by law for the crime of Obtaining
a controlled substance by Fraud and Fined
$300.00."
The defendant is granted a stay of execution of sentence to March 30, 1973
and the matter is

referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department.

April 6, 1973:
The defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date,
defendant appearing in person and being represented by Stan Smedley, as counsel;
Assistant County Attorney, Don Sawaya, appearing ia behalf of the State.

Now upoc

the Court's own motion and good cause appearing therefore, it is ordered that
the defendant be granted no further stay of execution of sentence and that a
commitment to issue forthwith in accordance with the sentence and Judgment previously
ordered.
And, you Delmar Larson, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah are hereby commanded to
take the said Arlene Rammell and deliver her without delay to the Utah State
Prison, then and there to be confined in accordance with the commitment heratofore
imposed.
Isauedi

Friday, April 6, 1973.

